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Foreword
Reinhart & Rogoff [2009] criticize the "this time is different" syndrome on default history,
and tell us "serial default is a nearly universal phenomenon" and "crises frequently emanate
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from the financial centers with transmission through interest rate shocks and commodity
price collapses", in their book, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. In
my understanding maybe they are right in the center-periphery relation, but an examina-
tion of debt crises after the World War II shows us diversified character of debt and financial
crises.
The purpose of this study is, firstly, to analyze the different type of causes of crisis,
lender-borrower relationship, financial innovation in transaction, and aftermath of the cri-
ses, secondarily, to find evolutionary change from bank lending to securitization, from tra-
ditional banking to financial engineering (computational finance), and thirdly to discuss the
possible ways to overcome and prevent the crisis. This paper is also a comparative study of
the debt and financial crises in developing and transitional economies as well as in the devel-
oped countries, such as the United States, and the Euro zone.
I. Debt and Financial Crises of Developing and Transitional Countries
(1) Legacy of Colonialism and Apartheid-Caused South African Debt
Let us begin our analysis by focusing the problem of continuing legacy of colonialism be-
fore comparing case studies of debt crisis. In many colonized governments a large part of the
debt was the result of unjust transfer of the debt by the colonizing powers, illegitimate or
dictatorial regimes and governing powers, to plunder massive mining resources and com-
modities produced in plantation, to oppress the people, to buy military weapons, and to im-
port luxurious items for the ruling class from creditor countries.
Apartheid-Caused South African Debt
One clear example is South Africa. South Africa's government after the World War II,
mainly led by National Party, maintained apartheid regime, a system of racial segregation
between 1948 and 1994. It is true that economic sanctions against South Africa were first en-
acted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1962, but Western industrial countries con-
tinued to support the regime .
When Nelson Mandela walked out of prison, rich countries and banks handed him and the
people of Southern Africa a bill for UKP28 billion. The apartheid regime was supposed not
only to oppress its own people, but to wage a full-scale war against Mozambique and Angola
and etc. by using the borrowed money. The people of Southern Africa, victims of apartheid,
were being asked to pay again for Apartheid-caused debt. The 90% of the long-term
Apartheid foreign debt in 1993 was owed to four creditor countries: the United States,
Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (APIC [1998], Njongonkulu Ndungane
[1999]).
Nelson Mandela, elected as President in 1994, and his colleagues faced the question
whether to pay this debt, or to renounce it as odious, saying that the sovereign debt incurred
without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, should not be considered transfer-
able to successor governments. In the end they made a tough decision to pay, in order to pro-
tect their credit rating and ensure that they would be able to access global financial markets
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in future (Owen Barder [2001]).
(2) Debt Crisis of Developing Countries in 1980s
During the 1960s to 1970s, the developing world received development funds for especially
infrastructure projects, through public resources such as governmental ODA (Official
Development Assistance) usually tied with imports obligation from the creditor(s), and in-
ternational financial institutions like World Bank, Asian Developmental Bank, etc.
Private Bank Lending
But after petroleum price hike in 1973, as most governments of industrial countries be-
came reluctant to assist the rest of the world, lenders shifted to roughly commercial deposit
banks (except to African countries), though borrowers were as well governments and state-
owned enterprises. Sovereign loan was commonly too huge for even big banks to handle
alone, and popularly used new method was mostly syndicated, US-dollar denominated bank
loan of 6 months roll-over (interest rate change) with every 3 month interest payment. That
was financial innovation for private banks whose assets were short-term deposit to lend mas-
sive money to sovereign states.
In the wake of Mexico's default in July 1982, and its spread to Latin America, most com-
mercial banks realized the crisis has at last come, and reduced significantly or halted new
lending to Latin America. The debt crisis of 1982 was the most serious of Latin America's
history. And the debt crisis spread over in the short time, to Korea, Indonesia, Philippines,
Poland, Hungary, Tanzania, Nigeria, Morocco, and so on, to all over the world.
Next a brief analysis of the causes of the crisis is given.
The first one was for lender: Paul Volcker, U.S. Fed Chairman, introduced strong dollar
policy, a mix of higher exchange rate and higher interest rate policy in 1979 in the battle
against world-wide stagflation in the latter half of 1970s.
Second for borrowers' triple punches: in the beginning of 1980s. Many oil-importing devel-
oping countries who suffered from ① appreciation of dollar exchange rate, ② dollar higher
interest rate, and ③ reduced price of export commodities in comparison with import items,
which made the debtors payment burden heavier in a short time (Killick [1984], Mohri
[1988]).
IMF Rescheduling and Conditionality
According to IMF (International Monetary Fund), this debt crisis had the prototype of
developing countries, in which debtor countries had three common symptom such as fiscal
deficit (overspending for infrastructure), hyper- inflation (over-issue of central bank note)
and trade (current account) deficit (imports exceeding exports). When it comes to short-
term balance-of-payment crisis, IMF seemed to be a refuge for debtors but it turned out the
bottomless pit of hell.
In return of short-term rescue loan from IMF and the rescheduling the debt payment, it
imposed standardized austerity (fiscal and financial belt-tightening) policies and deprecia-
tion of exchange rate to every indebted country regardless of economic structure or
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conditions. Too many targets in a short term have resulted in 'overkill' the economic growth.
The results for recipients were not good at all: reduction of employees and wages of civil
servants, reduction of subsidies in education, welfare services and state-run public services
and so on. IMF was given the big power as the central organizer of financial assistance, the
catalyst to induce other lenders, and the surveillance tower toward the third world. We are
not concerned in this paper why IMF got those power (See Mohri [1988] Chap. 4).
(3) Mexican Crisis in 1994－95
Securitized debt crisis
Again in Mexico, we saw the break out a new type of debt crisis in 1994－95. Most of the
external debt of Mexican government at that time was converted from foreign bank loan to
the Brady bonds.
In 1980s Latin America suffered "Lost Decade" with zero or minus GDP growth per capita.
We should point out two breakthrough schemes in 1989 to overcome debt crisis in 1980s. One
was the debt reduction strategy proposed by the U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicolas Brady. He
changed the perception on nature of debt crisis from "liquidity crisis" to "insolvency crisis"
and claimed the reduction and securitization of LA debt (U.S. loan share was high). The
Brady bonds allowed banks to get the debt off their balance sheets and reduced the concen-
tration risk to these banks.
The other was adoption of policy framework "the Washington Consensus", which was pre-
sided by DC-based think tank Institute for International Economics (now Peterson Institute
for International Economics) and most Latin American political leaders and economists be-
came convinced to tackle with. In 1990s LA countries introduced a series of economic policies
of neo-liberalism, such as strengthening of fiscal discipline, liberalization of interest rates
and exchange rate system, as well as foreign trade and inward direct investment, privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises, and so on (Williamson [2000]).
Mexico was the first to introduce the Brady bond scheme to get the financial assistance
from the U.S. and IMF, promised to liberalize the banking supervision, accounting rule, tax
administration, and the economy seemed to get recovered. But after NAFTA (North
American Free Trade Agreement) started in 1994, Mexico increased trade deficit owing to
the expansion of imports from the United States. Mexican peso declined, and then capital
withdrawal from Mexico expanded, and vicious cycle followed in due course.
Mexico had to face the sudden outflow of money by foreign investors in securities. This is
called the first "securitized debt crisis" after the World War II.
(4) Asian Currency and Financial Crisis in 1997－98
The crisis raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to financial contagion. The
crisis reached the worst in Thailand in July 1997 after the government's exhaustive efforts
to support the value of Thai baht. Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand were most severely
attacked by international speculators, and requested the IMF to give financial assistance,
total of $40 billion. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines were also hurt by the ex-
ternal economic events.
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Capital Account Crisis and Speculation
This crisis was characterized as capital account crisis (Yoshitomi [2003]), which didn't
compose inflation nor fiscal deficit but crisis countries suffered current account deficits,
which completely differed from the debt crisis in 1982. We should note that private capital in-
flow to four ASEAN countries and South Korea was $93 billion in 1996, but in 1997 $12.1 bil-
lion outflowed abroad, so we could assume that during two years the international flow of
funds had changed as much as $ 105.1 billion. Scale of the sum was equivalent to 10 percent
of GDP of five countries, which surely led to the fall of their exchange rate. Speculators
aimed at the suspension of de facto dollar peg system, which played the role to maintain sus-
tainable growth of exports, and rapid depreciation of exchange rate (Mohri [2001] Chap. 5).
The borrowers were not government sector but private firms and financial institutions,
and lenders and investors were composed of hedge funds, banks, institutional investors and
so on, and lending and investment were mostly in U.S. dollar denominated. There were dou-
ble mismatches in Thailand, one of which was borrowing foreign currency short, and the
other lending local currency long-term (Yoshitomi [2003]).
East Asia Miracle vs Total Factor Productivity
Before the crisis broke out, East Asian countries enjoyed the reputation of the world high
economic growth center as indicated in East Asia Miracle: Economic Growth and Public
Policy by World Bank [1993]. They surely maintained favorable fundamental economic per-
formance with growth, consumer price index, employment and budget balance. Good govern-
ance of macro-economy, high saving rate and educational standard, etc. were added to East
Asian growth model.
One problem was the overvalued exchange rate and current account deficit owing to the in-
creasing export competition with China. With the liberalization of exchange and capital
transactions, these countries came dependent on foreign capital inflows of private sector for
economic growth, and made the effort to attract capital investment especially to real estate
and financial markets.
There might be a presumable conspiracy denying the Asian Miracle hypothesis of the
World Bank. Prior to the Asian currency and financial crisis, not a few politicians and econo-
mists of international organizations, the United States and Europe began campaign insist-
ing that "Asian growth model would be an illusion". According to them, (1) Too much of
bank lending went to the specific industries and companies, under the collusion between bu-
reaucrats, politicians and big business, (2) Economic growth led by exports due to high sav-
ing rate had been at the expense of domestic consumption, (3) Export-led growth model
could be justified in the catch-up process, but would not function well in the globalized econ-
omy, (4) Financial sector had many problems in transparency and compliance with market
rules, (5) Economic growth in Asia was the result of quantitative productivity growth and
increase in input, not increase of total factor productivity. Among the advocates of this as-
sertion we found Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize winner in Economics later. Together with them
IMF too emphasized the vulnerability of the financial sector in Asia. The views toward Asia
were different between the World Bank and IMF.
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Currency Depreciation and Takeover
The currency depreciation plunged the affected economies into the abyss. The baht depre-
ciated drastically more than half of its previous value. The baht reached its lowest point of
56 units (45% level) to the US dollar in January 1998. The current value of total Thai stock
market dropped 75%. Indonesia had low inflation, and trade surplus before the crisis. But
owing to a huge borrowing in U.S. dollar by a large number of Indonesian companies, the
rupiah suddenly came under severe attack in August 1997. President Suharto resigned under
public pressure in May 1998. The exchange rate of rupiah to dollar plunged to 20% level be-
fore. From November 1997 to January 1998 the South Korean won, too, weakened to more
than half.
Those drastic currency depreciation meant that foreign currency-denominated liabilities
grew substantially in domestic currency terms, which caused the debt payment burden
heavyer, and more bankruptcies further deepened the crisis. IMF, letting the exchange rate
to fall freely, advised the affected countries to raise interest, saying 'to protect domestic cur-
rency and banking system'. Foreign investors took advantage of takeover of Asian compa-
nies cheaply.
Malaysia's Independent Path
Among the affected countries, Malaysia was worthy of special mention. Because it adapted
quite different policies in opposition to IMF. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad ad-
hered to maintain the fixed exchange rate, to regulate the outflow of international capital to
avoid speculation and economic confusion.
Naturally IMF and international financial community, who believed in the liberalization
of international capital flow, condemned these policies. But after one year or so, the policy
of capital control in small countries was internationally inclined to be recognized to protect
their own economy from the international speculative capital attack.
Financial Structural Reform Conditionality
IMF imposed the most highest hurdles in its history on Asian economies. They included
the closing of bad banks, clear classification criteria for lending, raising equity capital ade-
quacy ratio and allowance for loan losses, the elimination of excessive government interven-
tion, such as adoption of outside directors in governance reform, reduction of foreign
ownership restrictions, and so on. The latter measures included the dissolution of the
'zaibatsu' (banking and industry complex combined with government) in Korea, and the dis-
mantling of the Suharto family companies in Indonesia. IMF urged the governments to ac-
complish the austerity belt-tightening policies and to complete financial structural reform at
the same time.
Some governments obeyed, and others resisted. On the squares and streets demonstrators
and riots crowded out a lot of rallies and gatherings against IMF. After the crisis ceased,
people of the capital cities saw the increased direct investments by the U.S. and European
banks, accounting offices, consulting firms from IMF-friendly countries.
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(5) Russian Crisis in 1998
IMF-led Transition
In addition to the contagion of Asian crisis, the massive selling of government bonds was
the decisive factor in Russia. It introduced radical and comprehensive transition strategy to
a market economy in the early 1990s with advice of IMF/World Bank, but its economic per-
formance had been poor. It experienced a decade of minus economic growth, hyper-inflation,
large current account deficit and massive budgetary deficit with low taxation capacity, that
is exactly "Lost decade". Declining productivity and artificially overvalued fixed exchange
rate between the ruble and foreign currencies were also at the background of the crisis.
In Russian crisis, borrower was government, and lender and investors were hedge funds,
money center banks and IMF. IMF, as the standing adviser as well as main bank, disbursed
$27.7 billion (equivalent to 25% of the IMF total lending) to Russia and CIS (Commonwealth
of Independent States) countries from 1992 to 1998. IMF gave Russia a tremendously favor-
able treatment to prevent Russia and others from returning to old socialist regime, but
failed to make Russia a good and smart performer.
In June 1996, Russia agreed to accept the status of IMF Article 8 obligation, that is liber-
alization of current account transactions. But Russia was courageous enough to admit for-
eign investors to transact Russian securities and foreigners had nearly one-third of the
estimated balance of long and short government bonds at the end of 1997 (IMF [1999b]).
Around the same time, China accepted the IMF Article 8 in December 1996, but it continued
to be cautious whether to liberalize international capital flows, which prevented the conta-
gion of the Asian crisis to China. What a sharp contrast! (Mohri [2001], Chap. 5)
Russian Government Bonds held by Foreigners
A few years prior crisis, Russian fiscal deficit finance shifted from central bank reprinting
of the ruble to government bonds with extraordinary higher interest. The securities were
bought by minor domestic banks and foreign financial institutions. The former ones were
born as private banks in transition with little capacity to support real economic sectors. The
latter included giant hedge funds like LTCM (Long-term Capital Management) whose co-
partners were Nobel prize winners in 1997 for the excellent research of "option value theory",
widely used in derivatives by investment banks, hedge funds, and major commercial banks.
At last Russian financial crisis took place in 1998. Asian crisis decreased the demand of
crude oil and natural gas and nonferrous metals which severely affected Russian export and
revenue. In June 1998 Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, aged 35, in an effort to prop up the
currency and stem the flight of capital, hiked GKO (Government Short-term Commitments)
interest rates to as high as 150%.
The holders of government bonds wanted to sell a lot of quantity at higher price, but failed
to do so, and were compelled to keep at downgraded price. The U.S. investors were reported
to lose around $1.5 billion by depreciation of Russian bonds, stock and exchange rate.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York helped to bail out LTCM by establishing the joint financ-
ing mechanism (Soros[1998] ), which brought about 'too big to fail' rumor.
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(6) Argentine Crisis in 1999－02
De facto Dollarization
The most important problem of this section is that Argentina government adopted the
'convertibility' system with U.S. dollar without testing whether the two economies com-
posed of optimum currency areas. Argentina's de facto dollarization had been ignored, but
not refused by IMF.
In 1991, President Carlos Menem and Economic Minister Domingo Cavallo electrically
enforced ‘convertibility law’that is one peso equivalent to US$ 1 and any citizen could go
to a bank and convert any amount of domestic currency to U.S. dollar. The government at
the same time introduced the 'currency board system' as a super fixed exchange system
which brought about restrained inflation, consumer price stability and high economic
growth in the first half of 1990s, by adopting the Brady debt reduction program and neo-
liberal economic policies along the Washington Consensus.
The biggest drawback of the 'convertibility' system combined with U.S. dollar and mone-
tary policy of the United States was that Argentine government could not take its independ-
ent monetary policy appropriate for its business cycle, flexible exchange rate measures
against main trade partners with Brazil, Europe, and so on, and the exit cost was too expen-
sive even if to have a discussion on. This was the antecedent event Greece in the Eurozone of
single currency is facing to now.
Argentina still had external debt to pay and needed to borrow more money for these. The
overvalued fixed exchange rate made imports price cheap, but produced constant flight of
dollar away from the country, caused progressive loss of Argentina's industrial infrastruc-
ture and led to an increase in unemployment. IMF kept lending money to Argentina and
often postponing its payments in schedule. In spite of that economic performance, ironically
Argentina President was invited to the 1998 Annual Meeting of IMF/World Bank and
praised as "excellent economic performer in Latin America" in neo-liberal style.
But after the Asian crisis infected to Latin America, Argentine economy plunged into se-
rious phase owing to falling prices of its main export items such as agricultural and live-
stock products, with no other competitive export commodities. Brazil devalued its 'real' to
protect trade balance in January 1999, but convertibility law prohibited Argentina to follow.
In addition, U.S. dollar appreciation automatically made Argentina peso appreciated, which
harmed Argentina export trade. At that time main trade partners were Brazil whose ratio
is around 30%, Euro area 23%, so U.S. and Argentina were not at all suitable for 'Optimal
Currency Union'. Argentina had negative growth for four consecutive years from 1999, de-
cline of economic competitiveness, and expansion of fiscal deficits, and at last financial sys-
tem vulnerability came to the surface (Mussa [2002]).
Fiscal Deficit: Interest Payment to IMF and Pension Reform Failure
IMF at any time had criticized "the failures in fiscal policy" of Argentina. We can find out
some facts different from IMF's assertion.
In the former half of 1990s, it is true there were revenues of privatization of state enter-
prises, including petroleum, telephone, airline, water, postal service, etc., but at low prices
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favorable for buyers, and once-and-for-all basis. Second specific revenue was swap of debt to
commercial banks to 30-year Brady bonds. Argentina was able to regain access to the inter-
national financial markets, but interest rate was based on U.S. plus LIBOR (London Inter-
Bank Offered Rate).
In the latter half of 1990s, the increase of borrowing from IMF, international capital mar-
ket and domestic market, brought about the increase in interest payments especially abroad
in fiscal expenditure. IMF's generous lending policy had delayed Argentina to have a drastic
fiscal reform (Torre et al. [2003]).
Another significant drawback in fiscal policy was privatization of social security in 1994
supported by IMF. Private pension system was created and insurance premium in private
companies increased rapidly. But at the same time public system was also permitted to sur-
vive, then pension expenditure in public sector continued at high level. This was the second
cause for fiscal deficit in Argentina (Mohri [2001] Chap. 4, Mohri [2003]).
At last, at the end of 2001 Argentina was forced to announce the default of external debt
and freeze bank deposits. In early 2002, Argentina abolished the convertibility and currency
board system, and introduced floating exchange rate system. People found that peso had de-
preciated to less than one third and many companies and banks also suffered huge foreign
exchange loss through the conversion from dollar-denominated deposits and loans to peso-
denominated one.
II. U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis in 2007－10
The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis developed to the most critical worldwide one in finan-
cial and real economy since the great depression of 1930s. In subprime mortgage loan, origi-
nal lenders were mortgage bankers and regional banks, and borrowers were low credit
mortgage buyers. And the basic and starting structure of the crisis was the increase of delay
in interest payment of the mortgage. This is surely one of the debt crises, even if very much
complicated and sophisticated by financial engineering. This crisis should be analyzed as
moral, socio-political, financial and real economic one, though limited in economics.
Securitization and Financial Engineering
George W. Bush administration enjoyed the housing and credit bubbles for the beginning
after the IT burst in 2000s, but its policymakers did not recognize the increasingly important
and seriously damaging role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and
hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system.
Shadow banking system was able to mask their leverage levels from investors and regula-
tors through the use of complex, off-balance sheet derivatives and securitizations. No one
could tell who had credit and debt to whom, by what means, how big those risks were, and
when those would be burst. And the risk-taking culture of investment banking dominated
the conservative commercial banking culture. Turning point was the repeal of Glass-Steagall
Act in 1999, and with the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, commercial banks, invest-
ment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies were allowed to consolidate. Here is
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the 'revolutionary evolution' of fictitious capital (Mohri [2010])).
To begin with, some explanations would be necessary on new players and financial innova-
tions and the crisis development.
Firstly, subprime mortgage crisis itself began in the United States. Investment banks, rat-
ing companies, hedge funds of the Wall Street had played major roles with strong network.
Investment banks were superstars of shadow banking system, but until at last September
2008. Among big fives Bear Sterns was merged by JP Morgan and Chase in March, Merrill
Lynch was swallowed by Bank of America, Lehman Brothers collapsed, and Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley succumbed to collapse in confidence in their financial stability by con-
verting themselves into lower risk, tightly regulated commercial banks in autumn.
Institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, who own gigantic
pool of surplus money had been passive on the surface, but were greedy and mercenary to re-
quire products of higher yields to investment banks. Traditional deposit banks themselves
also propelled securitization.
Securitization of predatory mortgage by utilizing financial engineering (computational fi-
nance) was a new innovation. Financial engineering had developed a lot of new derivatives 'to
originate to distribute' model, like RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities), CDO
(Collateralized Debt Obligations), and CDS (Credit Default Swaps) (IMF [2008]).
The behavior of lenders changed dramatically into more loans to higher risk borrowers,
and predatory NINJA loans with the use of adjustable-rate mortgages, often no interest
payments for the first three years. Ninja is an abbreviation of No Income, No Assets and No
Jobs, in borrowers' condition.
Many mortgage lenders took eager borrowers' qualifications on faith, often with a 'willful
disregard' for a low-quality borrower's ability to pay. Mortgage market expanded rapidly
including a variety of financial institutions of the Wall Street. And non-recourse loan was
applied, that is, if the borrower defaulted, the lender/issuer could seize the collateral, but the
lender's recovery was limited to the collateral.
Secondly, on securitization practices: The traditional mortgage model involved a bank
originating a loan to the borrower/homeowner and retaining the credit (default) risk. The
modern version of U.S. mortgage securitization started in the 1980s, as Government
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) (namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) began to pool rela-
tively safe conventional conforming mortgages, sell securities to investors, and guarantee
those bonds against default on the underlying mortgages.
Tranches, Credit Ratings, CDSs
Thirdly, on tranches, credit ratings companies and Credit Default Swaps (CDS):
Individual securities were split into tranches, or categorized into varying degrees of subor-
dination by structure securitization technique. Each tranche had a different level of credit
protection or risk exposure than others: there was generally a senior ('AAA' to 'A') class of
securities, mezzanine ('BBB' to 'B') classes and C& below class of more junior subordinated
as protective layers for the 'A' class of investment grade securities.
Rating companies such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch had disguisedly sored
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subprime securities to high-return and low-risk products and created housing bubble. There
were only three rating agencies in the world, all of which were U.S. private firms, and they
had authentic roles which rank each security should take place on which yield varied.
But rating companies suffered from conflicts of interest, as they would be paid by the
firms that organize and sell the structured securities to investors, such as investment banks.
Critics often pointed out their rating had been arbitrary, sometimes favorable to U.S. inter-
ests and antagonistic to others.
Insurance companies had taken massive underwriting in case of default for which hedge
funds, institutional and private investors in the United States, Europe and Asia had pur-
chased securities of RMBSs and CDOs. Financial network had become too complicated and
sophisticated, so that no one could tell where the risks were, who would be next failing insti-
tutions.
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) were financial instruments used as hedge and protection for
debt holders, in particular MBS investors, from the risk of default, or by speculators to
profit from default. A worldwide wealthy investor Warren Buffett famously described CDS
as 'financial weapons of mass destruction'. Insurance companies such as American
International Group (AIG) faced ratings downgrades because widespread mortgage defaults
increased their potential exposure to CDS losses.
U.S. government recognized that AIG was 'too big and complicated to fail' on the next day
of Leman Brothers' collapse. Owing to the AIG's bailout of $173 billion by Bush
Administration, top ranking beneficiaries from taxpayer money were as following: Goldman
Sachs $12.9 billion, Societe Generale $1.19 billion, DZ Bank AG in Germany $1.18 billion,
Barclays $8.5 billion, Merrill Lynch $6.8 billion, Bank of America $ 5.2 billion and so on. The
executives of these institutions had paid large bonuses to themselves. This brought about the
resistance movement of Wall street occupation by 'the 99% common people' who would no
longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1% later.
Big Scale Impacts and G20 Summits
Since 2007, speculative money flew into forward commodities market, so the price of petro-
leum, gold, grain etc. were appreciated and depreciated drastically like a jet-coaster. After
Lehman collapse and AIG bailout, upset financial institutions especially of the U.S. rushed
to sell the securities to get cash money and repatriated their assets abroad to their headquar-
ters. The storm pulled down the price of stocks, securities and foreign exchanges world-
wide. The lost value of U.S. financial sector was estimated to be $2133 billion, Europe $1871
billion and Japan $148 billion in 2007－10.
The real economy was also depressed owing to the financial circulation suspension. The
GDP growth rate in 2009 plunged into minus in the developed countries: U.S. minus 2.8%,
Euro zone minus 4.2%, Japan minus 3.3%, while China and India decreased the rate but main-
tained plus growth, ASEAN countries plus minus zero, and the whole world minus 1.3%.
But the damage for the whole economy was smaller and shorter than anticipated immedi-
ately after the Lehman schock. The reasons why were that most central banks and govern-
ments learned from the lessons of great depression in the 1930s and rapidly addressed the
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monetary easing policies and big package of economic stimulus fiscal policies with back up
of IMF in the advanced countries as well as emerging populous countries, and most govern-
ments adopted friendly coordinated economic policies in the world-wide lebel.
G7 group of advanced countries, established in 1975, had the annual meetings and tackled
many important agendas for the industrial world to overcome the worldwide crises, includ-
ing the petroleum price hike-up by OPEC and the U.S. military defeat in the war against
Vietnam. But this time, the G20 summit, including the emerging big economies such as
China, India and Brazil took place for G7. G20 has increased the significant roles in leading
the global economy.
U.S. Strategy for 'World Empire of Money Flow'
There are many important issues to have discussion on. But I would like to focus on the
still remaining the U.S. hegemony and power. In spite of the huge damage U.S. suffered, it
has maintained the dollar as the world key currency position. Robert Rubin, Secretary of
Treasury of Clinton Administration II, in 1995, developed the U.S. strategy of 'world empire
of money flow', in face with the 'twin deficit' that is the rising current account and fiscal defi-
cit. The U.S. attracted a great deal of foreign investment, by relatively higher interest rate
and uprising stock prices, mainly from the current account surplus of Japan, emerging
economies in East Asia and oil-exporting nations.
These money inflow, mainly invested in low-yield government bonds, have exceeded the
current account deficit, so the United States could afford to invest the surplus capital in the
higher return sector abroad by direct investments, M&As, forward market of natural re-
sources and commodities. Obama administration advocated to increase the U.S. export and
change the structure of global imbalances, but has not referred to the U.S. position of 'world
empire of money flow' (Mohri [ 2010] Preface).
Misguiding Assumptions
This crisis is unique that there were questionable assumptions or judgments about the
U.S. financial and economic system. Among those, the following would be important. Before
and during the development of the crisis, warnings and cautions were masked by financial
institutions, medias, politicians and so on.
1) Housing prices would not fall dramatically;
2) Free and open financial markets supported by sophisticated financial engineering
would most effectively support market efficiency and stability by directing funds to the
most profitable and productive uses;
3) Thinking embedded in mathematics and physics could be directly adapted to markets,
in the form of various financial models used to evaluate credit risk;
4) Economic imbalances, such as large trade deficits and low savings rates indicative of
over-consumption, were sustainable; and
5) Stronger regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives markets was not
needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis).
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Financial Regulatory Reform
As to the financial regulatory reform debate, Paul Volcker-led Group of Thirty, the UN
Stiglitz Commission, and Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) did good jobs.
At first, Paul Volcker had influential effects on international financial society, especially
of the United States, just before the London Summit in April 2009. There are four core rec-
ommendations in the report of January 15, 2009.
(1) "Gaps and weaknesses in the coverage of prudential regulation and supervision must
be eliminated." The report notes that all systemically significant financial institu-
tions, called 'too big to fail', regardless of type, must be subject to an appropriate de-
gree of oversight, including insurance company, investment bank, private funds.
(2) "The quality and effectiveness of prudential regulation and supervision must be imp-
roved, including central banks, and much higher levels of national and international
policy coordination are required."
(3) "Institutional policies and standards must be strengthened, with particular emphasis
on standards for governance, risk management, capital, and liquidity." The report
also says that "regulatory policies and accounting standards must guard against pro-
cyclical effects and be consistent with maintaining prudent business practices."
(4) "Financial markets and products, including CDS and OTC (Over the Counter) deriva-
tives, must be made more transparent, with better-aligned risk and prudential incen-
tives. And the infrastructure supporting such markets must be made much more
robust and resistant to potential failures of even large financial institutions."
It was very natural Volcker's Report had affected on the US banking and political circles
and London Summit debate held in April 2009, from the profiles of the Group and setting
style of essential agenda (Group of Thirty [2009], Mohri [2010]).
In addition, Volcker with President Obama, on Jan. 21, 2010, announced the so-called
Volcker Rule, which specifically prohibited a bank from engaging in proprietary trading and
from owning or investing in a hedge fund or private equity fund, as well as limiting the li-
abilities that the largest banks could hold. This proposal aimed at the solution to 'too big to
fail' problem (Mohri [2010], Chap. 7).
On the other hand, so-called Joseph Stiglitz Commission reported on June 28, 2009, that
the UN 192 countries reached agreement on the crisis to be addressed and laid out the way
forward. Stiglitz himself stressed their report was stronger and more forceful than the G20
communique, putting importance to have an inclusive process, and taking care of developing
countries which do not have adequate resources for coping with the crisis. But Stiglitz report
was less welcomed by the main stream of the world media (Stiglitz [2010]; Mohri [2010]
Chap. 7).
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), compared to the Pecora Commission
which investigated the causes of the Great Depression in the 1930s, reported its findings in
January 2011. The Commission's conclusions were drawn from the review of millions of
pages of documents, interviews with more than 700 witnesses, and 19 days of public hearings




There have been advances in measures such as supervisory and regulatory framework for
too much expanded financialization and securitization. But at the same time the resistance
of the Wall Street and 'the City' of London have been getting stronger.
III. European Debt Crisis in 2009－
One year before U.S. subprime crisis broke out, several banks in Europe revealed massive
loss in transaction of sub-prime securitized products sold at New York and London markets
at highly leveraged level in the housing bubble of Europe. The troubled banks were BNP
Paribas, a leading bank in France, mid-sized IKB industry German bank, Northern Rock,
Britain's big mortgage bank and so on. European banks have universal financial service sys-
tem in which financial institutions can give banking and securities services to customers at
one-stop houses. They borrowed massive U.S. dollar and invested in high-yield securitized
products at the restriction-loose London market. In addition to the bubble and burst of
European housing markets, European financial institutions borrowed and invested in dollar-
denominated securities which suddenly increased the dollar demand. After the Lehman col-
lapse, the U.S. repatriation of money became huge to New York from London, Frankfurt,
Paris and so on, gave the European Union severe earthquake.
Although European countries have different aspects in financial industry, but in common
they took monetary easing policy, injected tax money into troubled financial institutions
and eagerly stipulated fiscal spending.
Here, I would like to examine on nature of Eurozone crisis, Greek trouble, and some issues
for future.
Nature of the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
From late 2009, fears of European sovereign debt crisis developed among investors, and
concerns intensified in early 2010 and thereafter. The crisis has resulted from a combination
of complex factors, including easy credit policies during and after 2001-05, the bailout policy
package for troubled banking industries and private bondholders, and massive fiscal stimu-
lus policy in the economic crisis after the Lehman shock.
European debt borrowers were mainly sovereign governments with massive bond issues
and lenders were local as well as international bankers, private and institutional investors.
Though they employed the derivatives and method of financial engineering of course, crisis
itself was rather simple. As CDS had played important role to show the default risk of each
bond in the case of U.S. subprime crisis, higher risk bond had marked higher CDS index in
Europe too. Financial sectors of highly indebted Eurozone countries were regarded more
risky. Fiscal crisis invoked financial crisis, and they got together especially in Ireland,
Greece and Iceland Portugal, Italy and Spain.
In 1992, members of the European Union signed the Maastricht Treaty, under which they
pledged to limit their deficit spending and debt levels. However, a number of EU member
states, including Greece and Italy, were able to circumvent these rules and mask their deficit
and debt levels, with the help of US investment bank, through the use of complex currency
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and credit derivatives structures. Even Germany and France, which have insisted fiscal disci-
pline, were also generous about their deficits at their bad times.
Problems of Single Currency System
European Union introduced Euro in 1999 in eleven countiries, and member countries have
increased to seventeen in 2010. Single currency system in the Euro area has made not only a
great progress for the European Union but also brought some problems complicated and
hard to solve. After the introduction of the Euro, the southern countries, such as Greece,
Portugal, Spain and Italy could raise money at lower interest rate owing to the higher cred-
itworthiness of Euro-denominated bond and invested more in housing and infrastructure in
a luxurious way. The northern countries, such as Germany, France, Netherland and Finland,
were also beneficial because they lent money and exported more to the southern countries.
Imbalance in international payments was expanded.
The difference in performance of economic activity and fiscal healthiness were not adjusted
automatically by the fluctuation of exchange rates and interest rate changes in single cur-
rency area. In addition, no policy measures have been introduced so far to overcome the fiscal
and trade deficits in Eurozone. Therefore, the North-South gap has become prominent there.
Paradoxically, non-Eurozone economies, like the United Kingdom, can change interest
rate and exchange rate according to its policy, and in crisis 'print money' in order to pay and
ease its risk of default.
Recent years saw growing trade imbalances in the area. Germany as well as the
Netherlands, and Finland have gained export surplus and had considerably better public debt
and fiscal balance relative to GDP than the rest of affected Eurozone members. In the same
period, the southern countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain) and Ireland, had far
worse balance of payments positions as well as fiscal deficit.
From the financial market viewpoints, we can see banks of France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Netherlands, bought government bonds of Southern Europe and lent money
to private banks there at higher rate. The European Union package of 'aid' to Greece and oth-
ers has played in large part a disguised bailout for big French and German banks in particu-
lar.
Greek Economy in Trouble
Greece had a very big sovereign debt. In 2011 the state owed around =C 350 billion ($461.6
billion), or 160 percent of its nominal GDP, the highest rate in Europe (Japan is more than
200 percent: the highest in the developed world).
As already described, when Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001, it reported cheatingly less
public borrowing level in order to meet the entry criteria with help of a U.S. investment
bank. Greece could get cheap money in bond issue, because the common currency euro offered
much lower interest rate than the Greek drachma bond. Money poured into the country in
preparation for the 2004 Olympic Games. Wages particularly in the public sector rose signifi-
cantly, although at the same time tax evasion and corruption were endemic.
In 2009, newly elected Prime Minister George Papandreou announced that its government
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needed to revise the deficit figures of the budget. Then Greece's credit ratings started to
plunge, and in the same year the Greek government estimated the size of the black market,
that is the untaxed economy, to be about 30 percent of the publicized economy. One reason
for Greek debt was that it has never taxed the Orthodox Church, the largest land and real
estate owner. And many Greek companies relocated, at least on paper, to Cyprus, tax haven
where the corporate tax rate is as low as 10 per cent (George [2010]).
Another untold story was the size of military spending and armaments imports in Greece.
Only China, India, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates bought more arms than
Greece in the five-year period ending 2009. Judging from the fact the top three have a consid-
erably population and GDP than Greece, its position was extravagant. Its ration to GDP was
1.7%, second to U.A.E.'s 3.9%. And arms imports were mainly from Germany and France.
The role of German and French banks in making loans to assist the Greek purchase of
German and French manufactured goods, for both civil and military uses, is a major element
in the entire saga of the ballooning Greek public deficit (Manolopoulos [2011]).
In 2010 Greece's debt rating was lowered to 'junk' status and the interest rates on Greek
bonds and their CDS index rose to a level that made borrowing unsustainable. Greece needed
to seek international help from the EU, ECB and IMF in exchange for severe budget cuts and
tough austerity measures. IMF conditionality was welcomed by the side who wanted to im-
pose the tightening budget discipline, because EU and ECB had no strong commanding
power.
Around March 9, 2012, Greece has succeeded in pushing through the biggest sovereign debt
restructuring in history, with 85.8 percent of those holding private Greek debt agreeing to
join a debt write-off deal, according to the Ministry of Finance in Athens. After long resist-
ing the idea of a default, European officials in March 2012 helped Greece negotiate a land-
mark debt structuring deal with the vast majority of its private sector lenders, who agreed
to swap 177 billion in Greek debt for new bonds worth as much as 75 percent less. The point
has been whether private creditor would agree or not.
Some Issues Important in the Future
(1) There were four prerequisite conditions of convergence to join the Eurozone, such as
annual budget deficit ratio to GDP less than 3%, accumulated scale of deficits less than 60%,
relative inflation rates and fluctuation band of exchange rates. But the requirements were
not always strictly adopted including Germany and France before and after the Eurozone
started. We do agree with the German and French assertion of ratification of Budget
Agreement to strengthen the budgetary discipline, but imposing the belt-tightening policies
on countries of fiscal deficit and debt crisis immediately could ruin their economies and the
lives of people as can be seen in the 'lost decade' of Latin America and Asia crisis countries.
We need the policy to get the economic recovery, by strengthening the tax collection from the
rich and cutting unnecessary expenditure immediately.
(2) In financial assistance, we've already gotten the report of the lending capacity expan-
sion of EFSF and the overall framework of ESM (European Stabilization Mechanism, the
former successor) which would be established ahead of schedule. And it would be important
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to define the character whether the debt is legitimate or odious, and whether it is 'insolvency
crisis' or 'liquidity crisis' for building the concrete measures to overcome the crisis. Scale of
the total necessitated funds depends on whether or not and to which countries the crisis
would spread over. If Spain and Italy would be included, significant increase of the resources
would be necessary, including more involvement of IMF.
(3) While the German economy is recognized as champion of high morale and productivity
and the largest beneficiary of Eurozone system, it has been reluctant to bail out southern
European "prodigal" countries by issuing the common Eurobonds. Though no one seriously
doubts that Berlin holds the key to the crisis, Financial Times, February 16, 2012, wrote
"many Germans want to be a big Switzerland, prosperous and neutral, not the decisive
European power that dictates the rules to the rest". After the World War II, the U.S., con-
structing the Pax Americana Regime, established IMF in line with the White plan under the
Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, gave $ 3.7 billion loan to the United Kingdom in 1945 and
provided the Marshall plan assistance more than $10 billion to European countries, including
defeated Germany and Italy. It is high time that Germany could play its appropriate role as
a most influential power of Eurozone. Germany should take more affirmative initiative for
the banking supervision and fiscal integration in the Euro-zone.
Concluding Remarks
(1) In my examination of debt crises after the World War II, I tried to show you the exis-
tence of continuing legacy of colonialism, and illegitimate or dictatorial governments and
the rich increased debts, for massive plunder of resources, to oppress the people, to buy mili-
tary arms, and for capital flight to Northern tax havens, taking Sub-Sahara African coun-
tries and Apartheid-caused debt of South Africa.
(2) I stressed that there has been exactly revolutionary evolution, from Latin America in
1980s to the U.S. and Eurozone crisis in 2000s, especially in financial engineering after the re-
peal of Glass-Steagall Act, separating investment from deposit bank. Finance capital has be-
come more remote from the concerns and activities of real people living and working in the
real economy and damaging to their lives. Though there have been different types of causes
of debt crisis, lender-borrower relationship, etc. one percent of management side people have
been winners and 99% losers.
(3) As for the way to overcome and prevent the crisis, I have to confess that bankers and
financial experts have been tough enough, and even if they failed they repeatedly stood up
again and again like a phoenix. Their speed of innovation in financial engineering has been
faster than regulators' measures.
(4) I skipped to explain technical detail how to regulate the financial industry, but we can-
not let greedy bankers to behave illegal, unfair business which have caused the financial cri-
ses and plunge 99 percent people into the unhealthy conditions. At least we have to introduce
some regulatory financial reforms proposed by Volcker committee, Stiglitz Commission and
FCIC Report. In addition we should note the immediate importance to introduce 'financial
transaction tax' (so-called Tobin tax) and some regulation to tax haven. Needless to say,
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IMF and World Bank need their policy framework and governance reform.
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